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Legal Research and Practical Experience 
Richard A. Posner† 
I have a motto, taken from Tennyson’s poem “Ulysses”: 
Match’d with an aged wife, I mete and dole 
Unequal laws unto a savage race, 
That hoard, and sleep, and feed, and know not me.1 
The aged wife, in my appropriation of Tennyson, is not the 
mother of my children but the federal judiciary, much in need of 
improvement, and the subject of this Essay is what academic re-
search of a particular type can do to help improve the federal  
judiciary. 
The judiciary could use quite a number of improvements, 
from top (the Supreme Court) to bottom (the immigration courts 
and the Social Security disability offices). Interdisciplinary legal 
fields such as law and psychology and law and economics have a 
major role to play in the design and evaluation of plans for im-
provement, but in this Essay I emphasize research methods that 
do not involve the kind of technical knowledge found in the nat-
ural and social sciences and can therefore be used by academic 
lawyers who are not interdisciplinary. I’m troubled by the fact 
that the faculties of the leading law schools are increasingly 
populated by refugees from the humanities or the social sciences.2 
Practical experience is vital to understanding and improving law, 
and suggests a need for law professors who base research on prac-
tical experience rather than on the social or natural sciences. 
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I’ve been a judge for thirty-five years and over that period 
my interest in legal research has narrowed to research that il-
luminates, and by doing so can alter, judicial behavior. Legal re-
search, in areas such as antitrust and regulation, that is based 
on economics and statistics has had profound effects on how 
judges interpret and apply the statutes and common-law princi-
ples that govern, or at least are supposed to govern, those fields. 
Legal research into the punishment and possible rehabilitation 
of child molesters and other compulsive sex offenders is making 
some, though very slow, progress toward the reform of the law’s 
treatment of such offenders.3 The role of psychology in this re-
search is fundamental, and psychology has also contributed im-
portantly to destroying the myth of the “demeanor cues”—the 
belief that the truthfulness of a witness can be inferred from ob-
serving his appearance and manner on the witness stand. In fact 
it can be inferred better from reading a transcript of the wit-
ness’s testimony, because the “demeanor cues” are not clues but 
distractions.4 
I would particularly emphasize statistical research, which 
has illuminated numerous facets of judicial behavior, ranging 
from the role of law clerks in writing their judges’ opinions,5 to 
the effect on the behavior of lower court judges of aspiring for 
promotion, for example to the US Supreme Court,6 to variation 
across circuits in reversal rates in politically sensitive types of 
cases,7 to regional variance in sentencing,8 and to much else be-
sides. Political science has contributed significantly to under-
standing the role of politics, of political ideology more broadly,9 
 
 3 See generally Christina Mancini and Daniel P. Mears, U.S. Supreme Court Deci-
sions and Sex Offender Legislation: Evidence of Evidence-Based Policy?, 103 J Crim L & 
Crimin 1115 (2013). 
 4 See Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 Cardozo 
L Rev 2557, 2559–66 (2008). 
 5 See generally Todd C. Peppers, Micheal W. Giles, and Bridget Tainer-Parkins, 
Surgeons or Scribes? The Role of United States Court of Appeals Law Clerks in “Appellate 
Triage”, 98 Marq L Rev 313 (2014). 
 6 See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Fed-
eral Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice 337–79 (Harvard 2013). 
 7 See generally Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judicial Hierarchy: Reversals and 
the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges, 40 L & Society Rev 163 (2006). 
 8 See generally Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased 
in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 NYU L Rev 1268 (2014). 
 9 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideo-
logical Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 Va L Rev 
301 (2004). 
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and of religion,10 sex,11 race,12 and other influences similarly re-
mote from “the law” (legal doctrine) on judicial voting. Political 
science and psychology combine to illuminate facets of judicial 
psychology such as the authoritarian personality that some 
judges have and its influences on criminal sentencing.13 
But in this Essay I emphasize forms of research into judicial 
behavior that do not depend on the social sciences. And even 
within that narrowed field I’m leaving out a lot, such as judicial 
biographies, which are valuable sources of knowledge of the ju-
diciary and which require no extralegal training to compose. But 
there are plenty of other examples of promising research that 
does not involve extralegal training, such as interviews of federal 
judges. In a study by Professor Mitu Gulati and me of the man-
agement by federal court of appeals judges of their tiny staffs,14 
a study based on phone interviews of 75 such judges selected 
more or less at random, we found that only 3½ (4.7 percent) tell 
their law clerks to call them (the judges, that is) by their first 
names, the ½ being a judge who allows her clerks to call her by 
her first name only outside the courthouse, as she believes that 
her colleagues would be angry with her if they discovered that 
she was allowing her clerks such liberties of address.15 
What is odd about such judicial formality is that modern 
businesses tend to require all their professional employees to be 
on a first-name basis with each other, even to the point at which 
the company’s CEO is addressed by his underlings by his first 
name.16 This is done not out of affection but to create an atmo-
sphere, believed to elicit greater loyalty, commitment, and effort 
among junior professional employees, in which the juniors feel 
 
 10 See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the 
Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 
Ohio St L J 491, 501–03, 576–84 (2004). 
 11 See generally Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Col-
legial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 Yale L J 1759 (2005). 
 12 See generally Pat K. Chew and Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: 
An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 Wash U L Rev 1117 (2009). 
 13 See Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 98–103 (Harvard 2008) (offering a 
sketch of the authoritarian tendency in judicial psychology). 
 14 See generally Mitu Gulati and Richard A. Posner, The Management of Staff by 
Federal Court of Appeals Judges, 69 Vand L Rev 479 (2016). 
 15 Although my information about law clerks’ being or not being on a first-name 
basis with their judges derives from my study with Gulati, it is not discussed in the arti-
cle, but rather in my book Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary 372–73 
(Harvard 2016). 
 16 See id, citing Jodi Glickman, What’s in a (First) Name (Harvard Business Re-
view, Nov 1, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/U4AE-Q933. 
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that their views are valued. Fifty years ago, probably twenty 
years ago, such informality would have been unthinkable by 
businessmen as well as by judges. The former have changed; 
why not the latter? Because the legal profession, including its 
judicial branch, is stodgy, backward-looking, timorous, and inse-
cure, as I illustrate throughout this Essay. 
Professor Abbe Gluck and I have been interviewing federal 
court of appeals judges with respect to their beliefs and practices 
regarding statutory interpretation. The interviewees have tended 
to divide into roughly four groups. One we call the “sourpusses” 
because they are merciless with respect to the numerous imper-
fections in the legislative process. To take an extreme example, 
imagine that an ordinance states: “No vehicles in the park.” A 
visitor to the park falls into a pond, an onlooker calls 911, an 
ambulance roars into the park to rescue the flailing visitor—and 
a police officer gives the ambulance driver a ticket for violating 
the ordinance. Most judges would consider the officer to have 
erred, because surely the enactors of the ordinance did not in-
tend “no vehicles” to mean “no vehicles, even emergency vehi-
cles.” But the sourpusses would say: an ambulance is a vehicle, 
therefore the ordinance includes ambulances, and though the 
result is silly, it was the enactors who screwed up, and we 
should let them clean up their mess. 
Judges whom we interviewed who had had firsthand experi-
ence with legislators, as either legislators themselves, members 
of legislative staffs, or members of agencies such as the Office of 
Legal Counsel in the Justice Department that work with legisla-
tures, were confident of their ability to interpret statutes, feeling 
that they knew what kinds of legislative history provide reliable 
guidance to the legislators’ intentions and what kinds do not. 
These “legislators” tend to be eclectic in their use of various aids 
to statutory interpretation. 
Judges in the third group tend to be even more eclectic. 
They rely on such interpretive aids as dictionaries, all types of 
legislative history, both linguistic and policy canons of construc-
tion, precedents, literal meanings of statutory terms (what law-
yers and judges like to call “plain meaning”), implicit statutory 
purpose, and the meaning of related statutes. 
Finally, a few judges rely on common sense, and a few of 
those few are skeptical about statutory interpretation altogeth-
er, noting that issues that arise in litigation relating to the 
meaning or application of statutes often were not foreseen by the 
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legislature that enacted the statutes. In such cases, there is no 
intended meaning to be recovered, leaving the judges to play in 
effect a legislative role. Judges on this view are not only common-
law legislators but also interstitial statute-makers. 
A final point is the utility of having a judge be part of the in-
terview team in every case in which a judge is being inter-
viewed. There is a certain clubbiness among federal judges, 
which tends to make judges more comfortable if their interview-
ers include judges. 
I want now to emphasize a source of understanding of judges 
that is not research based at all. And that source is common 
sense, aided or not by experience and intelligence. It shouldn’t 
require study or science to demonstrate that jurors should be al-
lowed to ask questions because otherwise there’s a risk they’ll be 
forced to decide the case without knowing enough to decide it 
sensibly; or that jurors should be permitted to discuss the case 
(though not decide what their verdict will be) whenever they’re 
in recess in the jury room, as otherwise when it comes time to 
deliberate they may have forgotten critical evidence; or that ju-
rors should not be given pattern jury instructions because such 
instructions are legalistic. 
Being unscientific and unsystematic, common sense, con-
ceived of as a basis for critique of legal conventions (some going 
back centuries, illustrating the stodginess that is among the un-
attractive features of our legal culture), is likely to be derided by 
law professors, judges, and lawyers alike. For the legal profes-
sion likes to think of itself as a guild of learned experts, masters 
of esoteric doctrines cloaked in esoteric language. Most lawyers, 
judges, professors, and law clerks would feel naked without their 
jargon-captioned rules and doctrines: “actual innocence,” “clear 
and convincing,” “arbitrary and capricious,” “eiusdem generis,” 
“suspect class,” “rational basis,” “strict,” “heightened,” and “in-
termediate” scrutiny, “narrow tailoring,” “contra proferentem,” 
“de minimis non curat lex,” and so on ad infinitum. (Wikipedia 
lists about four hundred Latin terms used in US law.)17 All these 
terms, and many others, are dispensable. 
Another type of badly needed research on the federal judi-
ciary is research on trials, both criminal and civil. Interviews 
with district judges (and also bankruptcy and magistrate judges) 
are a largely unexplored research technique. Other techniques 
 
 17 List of Latin Legal Terms (Wikipedia), archived at http://perma.cc/MHC9-598L. 
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include simple observation of trials, study of court records, mock 
trials, and use of trial formats, utilizing the highly realistic trial 
folders of the National Institute for Trial Advocacy, to structure 
law school evidence courses (my approach when some years ago 
I taught evidence at The University of Chicago Law School). 
I am particularly interested in what I call “district court re-
search” because ever since my appointment to the Court of  
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit I have tried cases as a volunteer 
in the district courts of the circuit. Until recently I had tried just 
civil cases, conducting jury and bench trials and also supervising 
discovery, settlement negotiations, and other pretrial phases of 
civil cases. Lately I have begun trying criminal jury cases. 
I’ve learned a lot about the trial process from my forays into 
the district court. One thing I’ve learned is that all appellate 
judges who like me had not been a trial judge or a trial lawyer 
before becoming a judge should conduct trials, for I have learned 
from my trial experience that the conduct of a trial and the ap-
pellate review of the trial court’s judgment are radically differ-
ent experiences. But like real trial judges, much of what I do in a 
trial is a result of hunch, guesswork, or speculation rather than 
solid judgment. 
I need finally to mention the Supreme Court, a troubled in-
stitution. The Court is not well managed, though that is nothing 
new. Forget the spittoons (a spittoon is “a metal or earthenware 
pot typically having a funnel-shaped top, used for spitting  
into”18) next to each justice’s seat in the courtroom; that is sheer 
antiquarian silliness. Think rather of the five-year interval be-
tween the rendering of a decision and its publication in the US 
Reports; of the refusal of the Court to disclose the vote (not the 
voters) in cases in which certiorari is denied (disclosure that 
would signal the importance of the issue sought to be resolved 
by the Court, and therefore encourage or discourage future ef-
forts to persuade the Court to hear a case presenting the issue); 
of the refusal of justices, when they recuse themselves from 
hearing a case, to give the reason for their recusal (or for refus-
ing to recuse themselves, if a responsible recusal motion is filed); 
of the bunching of opinions at the end of June, rather than mak-
ing September the deadline, so that cases argued late in the 
term (April) would receive due consideration rather than being 
rushed out in time for the summer break; of the inordinate 
 
 18 Define: Spittoon (Google), archived at http://perma.cc/NH84-DQ4D. 
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length of opinions; of the unmemorability of the dissenting opin-
ions; of the warring footnotes and occasional lapses into incivility; 
of the excessive reliance on law clerks. These things could be 
changed by an aggressive chief justice. What cannot be changed 
is the justices’ pretense that they do not make law but merely 
apply it.19 
I also think that the Court is diminished from the 1960s, the 
heyday of the “Warren Court.”20 When I think back to the 1960s, 
when I was a clerk to a Supreme Court justice for one year (the 
1962 term) and later an assistant to the solicitor general (1965–
1967), I am struck by the poverty of the Court’s resources then 
compared to what they are now—yet by a sense that its much 
greater resources at present have not improved it. Each justice 
now has four law clerks; in the 1962 term each had just two (ex-
cept the chief justice, who had a third law clerk to process the 
pro se petitions for certiorari). And rarely these days is a clerk 
hired who has not clerked for a federal court of appeals judge—
whereas until the late 1960s it was the unwritten law of the 
Court not to hire as a law clerk anyone who had been a law clerk 
to another judge. The clerks were good—some excellent—but the 
average quality was inferior to what it is today; the job was less 
coveted, there was no signing bonus, and the justices tended to 
be more casual about the appointments process, often delegating 
the appointment to a law professor, a personal friend, or a pro-
fessional acquaintance, without interviewing the clerk candidate 
or even receiving an application from him (no “her”—all clerks 
were male in those days). There was of course no electronic re-
search back then. There also was no cert pool; no organized  
Supreme Court bar; and, dramatically unlike today, the justices 
asked few questions at the oral arguments—and this despite the 
fact that the standard amount of time allotted for argument to 
each side was forty-five minutes rather than the current thirty 
minutes. And yet, despite everything, the Court heard twice as 
many cases as it does now. Probably the justices also worked 
harder in those days, since the celebrity culture had not yet em-
braced them. Indeed, with the exception of Justice William O. 
Douglas, they were wallflowers. (Justice Hugo Black, like Doug-
las, had charisma, but he did not cut a public figure.) 
 
 19 Richard A. Posner, What Is Obviously Wrong with the Federal Judiciary, Yet Em-
inently Curable: Part II, 19 Green Bag 2d 257, 266 (2016). 
 20 The next several paragraphs draw heavily on my book Divergent Paths (cited in 
note 15). 
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The members of the Court back then, in order of appoint-
ment, were Justices Black, Douglas, Tom Clark, Earl Warren, 
John Marshall Harlan II, William Brennan, Potter Stewart,  
Byron White, and Arthur Goldberg. There were some dim bulbs, 
but Black, Douglas, and White were extremely smart (though 
Douglas was irresponsible), and Harlan, Stewart, and Brennan 
were perhaps a little less smart but thoroughly competent. The 
professional backgrounds of the justices were far more diverse 
than those of any of the current justices. Black had been a suc-
cessful trial lawyer and influential senator; Douglas a promi-
nent “realist” law professor at Yale and head of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission; Warren a three-term governor of 
California, his first term being during World War II. Clark had 
been US attorney general in the Truman administration; Brennan 
had had a distinguished career as a private practitioner, as a 
military administrator during World War II, and as a state trial 
judge and state supreme court justice in New Jersey at a time 
when the New Jersey judiciary, under the leadership of Chief 
Justice Arthur Vanderbilt, was outstanding; Goldberg had been 
secretary of labor in the Kennedy administration, and White 
had been deputy attorney general in that administration. There 
was greater educational diversity as well. Two justices had 
graduated from Yale, one from Harvard, one from Columbia, 
and the rest from the University of Texas, the University of  
Alabama, Northwestern, New York Law School, and Berkeley. 
In contrast, all the present justices attended law school at either 
Harvard or Yale, though Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg spent a 
year at (and graduated from) Columbia. None has significant po-
litical experience (none has ever run for political office). Only 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor has substantial trial experience; she is 
also the only justice who was once a trial judge. 
The 1962 term was the term in which Justices Charles 
Whittaker and Felix Frankfurter were replaced by White and 
Goldberg, consolidating the Warren Court, which persisted with 
only two changes in membership (the replacements of Goldberg 
by Justice Abe Fortas in 1965 and of Clark by Justice Thurgood 
Marshall in 1967, which were not significant ideological changes) 
until Warren’s retirement in 1969 and his replacement by Chief 
Justice Warren Burger. The Warren Court went overboard in a 
number of areas, but most of its landmark decisions, dealing 
with such issues as reapportionment, the right to counsel, the 
application of the Fourth Amendment to the states, the Miranda 
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warnings, and sexual rights, have survived to this day. It seems 
unlikely that the current Court will have a comparable legacy, 
despite what might appear to be its vastly greater resources and 
vastly superior working conditions. 
I believe that the average quality of the justices back then 
was higher than that of the current justices and that the current 
justices are overstaffed, talk too much at oral argument, and de-
vote an excessive amount of their time to extrajudicial activities, 
but also that what made the earlier Court better despite its 
meager resources by current standards was mainly the diversity 
in the justices’ professional backgrounds. Today, judged by edu-
cational and professional backgrounds, and despite pronounced 
ideological differences, the justices are peas in a pod.21 (I do not 
consider race, sex, or ethnicity forms of diversity relevant to the 
Supreme Court.) 
Among useful reforms to the Court, I would emphasize fewer 
law clerks, none with prior clerkships; more cases heard; more 
time allotted to oral argument; no amicus curiae briefs without 
considered permission of the Court; career diversity among jus-
tices; prompt publication of the US Reports; no footnotes in opin-
ions; limits on opinion length; appointing as chief justice only a 
person with proven high-level managerial skills and a national 
reputation (examples of such chief justices being William Howard 
Taft, Charles Evans Hughes, and Earl Warren); televising oral 
arguments; eliminating the June deadline for issuing opinions 
and the summer recess; giving the opinions to the press a day in 
advance of issuance to enable them to publish a responsible arti-
cle on the day of issuance; not requiring that justices reside or 
work in Washington; dropping the pretense that the Court “in-
terprets” the eighteenth-century Constitution rather than 
makes up constitutional law as it goes along. And for heaven’s 
sake throw out the spittoons! 
Of course, none of these reforms will be implemented in the 
foreseeable future, if ever. But I’m not concerned, in this short 
Essay, with achievable reform; I’m interested in showing the 
reader that legal reform need not depend on, and therefore need 
not await, social-scientific, other scientific, or rigorously academic 
study. Most of what is wrong with American law in general, and 
the federal judiciary, which is the American legal institution that 
I know best (indeed the only one I know well), is either obvious, 
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or discernible with practical experience and insight not requir-
ing scientific study (such as the absurdity of the Bluebook and of 
the dread of the italicized period), or requires more such study, 
such as the manifold deficiencies of the jury trial as currently 
administered. 
